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Abstract 
Violent conflicts in Africa have claimed millions of lives, displaced many more and mortgaged the 
continent’s development. Yet, the study of their causes, dynamics and consequences is far from holistic 
and unified, but is instead fragmented, contested and divided along disciplines. Part of the problem is 
that, such complex conflicts are not amenable to mono-causal analysis and rigid theorization, but 
instead can only be better understood through multidisciplinary analyses of contested historical 
processes in which local and global forces interact to produce contingent, contradictory and 
ambiguous trajectories of violent change. This paper attempts to build a more holistic understanding of 
violent conflicts in Africa that transcends the limits of mono-causal and deterministic models of 
violence. Critically synthesizing competing perspectives, it highlights some of the many inextricably 
interlinked local and global causes and escalation factors of violence in Africa.  
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Violent conflicts are increasingly becoming a major defining feature of Africa‟s political landscape. 
Violence is turning the continent into a Hobbesian “state of nature” of “war of each against all” in 
which life is “short, brutish and nasty” (2016). Violence has claimed the lives of millions, displaced 
many more, cost more than 150 pounds, and mortgaged the continent‟s development (Iansa, 2007). The 
conflicts have also attracted increased but inconclusive research and literature on the continent. As 
Porto (2002, p. 1) notes, the research has left a “trail of uncertainty, partial clues, contradiction, and 
continued mystery”. Different disciplinary analytical priorities and methodologies have led to “a 
disturbing lack of integrative knowledge on the subject” (Porto, 2002, p. 1). Research “remains 
fragmented between disciplinary boundaries, which produce conflicting and often mutually exclusive 
theories” (Porto, 2002, p. 1). In an endeavor to address this analytical challenge, this paper develops a 
holistic analytical framework that builds on insights from the contending and mutually exclusive 
theories of violent conflicts in Africa.  
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A broad brush based on secondary research and deductive analysis, the paper advances four interrelated 
propositions. First, violent conflicts in Africa have many causal and escalation factors, and these 
include: psychological, political, economic, and social conditions; the nature of the protagonists and 
key actors; the relations between conflict parties; the conditioning contexts which structure the conflict 
(economic, ethnic and religious); and external forces. Second, depending on circumstances, any of the 
many causes of conflict may assume primacy, while other equally important causes may be overlooked, 
often with serious implications for post-war peace building. Third, underlying the many apparent 
causes of conflicts in Africa is the undying desire for happiness, a desire which has been frustrated by 
our inadequate political, economic and social systems. Finally, changes in key actors and of the 
external environment can lead to a redefinition of the goals of the conflict. In short, the paper argues 
that individual personalities, social processes, systems and institutions, historical coincidences, and 
local and global forces have all contributed to shaping the goals, dynamics and consequences of violent 
conflicts in Africa; the paper‟s breadth of coverage unavoidably compromises its depth. 
 
2. Theorizing Violent Conflict in Africa 
Attempts at theorizing African conflicts have “spawned different approaches and frameworks” 
(Hutchful & Aning, 2004, p. 197). Distinct theoretical paradigms have emerged, with different 
emphases and policy recommendations for resolving the conflicts. Broadly these paradigms and 
generic models include psychological, social, functionalist and formal theories (Miall et al., 1999, p. 
66). Paul Wehr (1979) identifies seven competing approaches: conflict is innate in social animals; it is 
generated by the nature of societies and the way they are structured; it is dysfunctional in social 
systems and symptom of pathological strain; it is functional in social systems and necessary for social 
development; it is an inevitable feature of competing state interests in conditions of international 
anarchy; it is a result of misperception, miscalculation and poor communication; it is a natural process 
common to all societies. Further attempts to clarify the nature of the issues in conflict have led to the 
development of “conflict causes” as a new and “most frequently invoked typology” (Porto, 2002, p. 6). 
According to Singer (cited in Porto, 2002, p. 6), within this typology “all the usual suspects are found: 
territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, 
markets, dominance, equality, and, of course, revenge”. These schools of thought have apparently 
irreducible discrepancies on their conceptualization of violent conflict, its causes, dynamics and 
consequences. Part of the problem is the fact that, truth is often the first casualty of war. 
 
3. Psychological Theories of Conflict 
In her psychopolitics book, Why War, Rose (1993) stresses the unconscious in our violent cultural and 
political lives. Personality traits—Machiavellianism, sadism and narcissism—and the subconscious can 
cause some individuals to be violent. From this psychoanalysis perspective, people with malevolent 
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personality traits are “more prone to being duplicitous and self-serving, cold-hearted and lacking in 
empathy, vain and selfish, and more likely to derive pleasure from other people‟s pain” (Times of 
Swaziland, 2015, p. 22). Rebel leaders like Joseph Kony of the Lord‟s Resistance Army in Uganda and 
Abu Shakier of Boko Haram in Nigeria, among others, are seen as psychopaths driven by their 
malevolent personality traits. Thinking out of the psychological box, Freud (1961, pp. 43-44) identifies 
the inadequacy of “our methods of regulating human relationships in the family, community and the 
state” as one of the three major sources of unhappiness and conflict: “We cannot see why the systems 
we have ourselves created should not rather ensure protection and well-being for all of us”.  
Reflecting psychology‟s obsession with the individual, Freud (1961, p. 44) advised: “every man must 
find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved. In trying to „be saved‟, some have 
become rebels, criminals, pirates while others have become peace activists or refugees”. For Fanon 
(1968), the Algerian psychologist and freedom fighter, violence against the oppressor can be a 
liberating and empowering experience. As evidenced by the increasing post-independence 
disillusionment across Africa, Fanon‟s celebrated anti-colonial violence did not empower the poor, but 
instead, and with catastrophic consequences, it entrenched cults of violence into society. 
 
4. Social Theories of Violence 
Social theories of violence can be broadly divided into processes, structural and functionalist theories. 
Social process theories depict conflict as a result of social change and interaction between groups, such 
as the Dinkas and Nuers in South Sudan, Moslems and Christians in Nigeria, Somalia and Mali, 
seeking to protect their interests by controlling society (Porto, 2002). For Marxists (see Mclellan, 1972), 
conflict is not only inevitable, but it is the engine behind historical change and development. Conflict is 
thus “a creative and necessary means of bringing about social change” (Miall, 1999, p. 96). Mazrui‟s 
(1995) conception of conflict in Africa as “a retreat from modernity” is therefore ahistorical. 
Structuralists posit that violence is: embedded in the social structures of society; a product of the ways 
in which society is formed and organized and; legitimated by the dominant value system. The 
childhood psychological and physical violence endured in the family, community, school, and in 
society tends to produce violent people who know violence as the only strategy of resolving conflict. 
Rebels racking havoc in Africa can thus be considered products and victims of the violent system. 
From a functionalist perspective, violence and war perform a necessary function in society. The view 
that “war is inimical to human progress”, most articulated by Nef (1950), has been criticized by Hegel 
(1967), Hall (1987) and Bayart (1995). While in Europe war helped create the empire and accelerated 
technological innovation (Hall, 1987), in Africa the social changes it has catalyzed are overshadowed 
by its destructiveness. 
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5. Causes of Violent Conflict in Africa 
There are many causes of violent conflicts in Africa, and these include, ethnic marginalization, 
religious differences, access to resources, poor governance and leadership, self-determination and 
territory. Singer (cited in Potro, 2002, p. 6) identifies “territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, 
language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, dominance, equality, and revenge” as the 
key immediate drivers of conflict in Africa. According to Kaldor (1991), such “new wars” are about 
identity politics and self-determination “in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier 
wars”. The growth in such identity politics is due “to the vacuum created by the absence of 
forward-looking projects and the failure of other sources of political legitimacy, such as socialism or 
the nation-building rhetoric of first generation post-colonial leaders” (Kaldor, 1991). This paper 
stresses the failure by the state to satisfy people‟s desires for decent livelihoods and happiness as the 
underlying driver of ethnic, religious, ideological and resource conflicts in Africa.  
 
6. Ethnic and Religious Conflicts 
Beginning in the 1990s ethnic conflict became the “most fashionable term and last resort to explain 
contemporary social conflicts” (Porto, 2002, p. 6). Examples of violent ethnic conflicts include: the 
1980s violent conflict in Matabeleland of Zimbabwe, which, pitted the Shona led government against 
the Ndebeles, and in which about 20 000 people were killed; the Rwanda genocide of 1994 in which 
about 800 000 Tutsis were butchered by Hutu militia in 100 days and; the on-going conflict in South 
Sudan between the Dinkas and Nuers. 
The literature on ethnicity is inconclusive. On the one hand, ethnicity has been depicted as “a 
primordial or inherited group characteristic” that some consider biologically based (Porto, 2002, p. 7). 
On the other hand, it is seen as “an instrument”, “a tool” contextually “used by individuals, groups, or 
elites to obtain some larger, typically material end” (Porto, 2002, p. 7). Often “ethnicity is socially 
constructed, created or de-emphasized by power seeking political elites in historically determined 
economic and social arrangements” (Sisk, 1996, p. 12). Ethnic identities “wax and wane, contingent on 
a wide variety of variables, including the capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can 
effectively mobilize groups for collective aims and articulate beliefs about common ancestry and 
destiny (Sisk, 1996, p. 12). As a basic human need, ethnicity is “fluid, malleable, constructed, and 
negotiated” (Sisk, 1996, p. 12), and when manipulated by political gladiators, it can spark and fuel 
violent conflict. 
The distinct ethnic dialects and traditions make ethnic identity stronger and more enduring than other 
collective identities based on class or ideology, and therefore, it is “most likely to provide the basis for 
political mobilization and conflict when it provides the basis for invidious distinctions among 
peoples … that are deliberately maintained through public policy and social practice” (Porto, 2002, p. 
8). In and of itself, ethnic identity is innocent, but only becomes a virulent source of conflict when 
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economic inequalities are politicized and “ethnicized”, and when certain ethnic groups are marginalized 
or denied access to resources. Invoked only in dealing with real issues of economic inequities and 
social injustices, ethnicity, like religion, can, at one level, be considered a form of false consciousness. 
From Biblical times, religion has been both a source of war and peace, and indeed numerous wars have 
been fought in the name of religion (Chingono, 2014). In north and east Africa a new militant religious 
ideology, Islamic Jihad, is attracting “youth who are deeply discontented with their governments” to 
become rebels (cited in Weekend Argus, 2015). Feeding on frustration and disillusionment at poor 
political and economic governance, religion has engineered the subversion of the state by justifying 
war in Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt and Mali.  
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group which emerged from the ruins of the country‟s 
civil war, and which is linked to al-Qaeda, is fighting to establish an Islamist state. Drawing its 
“support from a conservative Somali population and play[ing] on perceptions of government 
corruption”, Al-Shabaab has “presented itself as a viable alternative to the government in territories it 
controls, providing citizens with the services and infrastructure the state is unable to offer” (de Villiers, 
2015, p. 4). Similarly, in Nigeria, an Islamic militant group, Boko Haram, which means, “western 
education is forbidden”, is engaged in a bloody war against the central government and is trying to 
form its own state in northern Nigeria under strict interpretation of Islamic law. Dismissed by some 
Christians as demonic, the group has a membership of about 15 000 drawn mainly from the poorest 
region of the country, and “from uneducated, unemployed and socio-economically disadvantaged 
Nigerian Northerners who are fed up with corruption, heavy-handed state security forces and neglect of 
the north” (de Villiers, 2015, p. 3). 
In other words, underlying these manifestly religious conflicts are “local grievances as a result of 
political and socio-economic marginalization and the inequitable distribution of resources in the 
countries” (de Villiers, 2015, p. 3). Perceived western economic, political and religious domination has 
given further impetus to anti-West Islamic militancy. As Marx pointed out, religion is therefore not just 
“an opium of the people”, but is also “a cry in a soulless world”, a “form of struggle against 
oppression” and an attempt at setting free a new vision of society (see Mclellan, 1972). In a nutshell, 
material conditions of poverty and depravation have provided fertile ground for politicizing ethnicity 
and for religious ideology, which promises a better world of prosperity, to flourish. 
 
7. Population Explosion and Economic Resource Wars 
Now home to 1.2 billion (up from just 477 million in 1980), Africa‟s acceleration of annual population 
growth has given momentum to violent struggles to access and control valuable natural resources, such 
as minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures and farming land across the continent. Bish (2016, p. 1) 
warns, “while population growth slows in the rest of the world, it continues to rise in Africa”, and with 
dire consequences. Malthus (1826) had warned of the risks associated the arithmetic progression in 
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productivity and geometric progression in population growth. His critics believed progress in science 
and technology would avert the risks of violent competition for scarce resources associated with over 
population and overconsumption. As Malthus (1826) feared, and as evidenced by the continent‟s 
increasing dependency on food aid, Africa‟s population growth rates, currently at about 30 million 
people per year (Bish, 2016), have far outstripped food production increment rates, leading to violent 
struggles for access to resources, crime and war. 
Economic resources, both scarce and abundant, together with other variables, play an important role in 
the onset and escalation of violent conflict (Lind & Sturmant, 2002). According to Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004, p. 7) economic factors are actually “the main drivers of conflict” and “economic agendas are 
central to the origins and continuance of many civil wars”. The use and control of ecological resources 
as causes of conflicts is motivated by both grievance and greed (Porto, 2002, p. 2). Using an 
expected-utility theoretical model, with the premise that “rebels will conduct a civil war if the 
perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion”, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 10) conclude that, 
greed seems more important than grievance: “while the greed model is superior, some elements of the 
grievance model are likely to add to its explanatory power”. 
In a chaotic war situation there are a number of possibilities for the greedy to enrich themselves and 
profit from war. In fact, “various identifiable groups”, such as arms dealers, smugglers, illegal miners, 
poachers, pirates, some businesses and military leaders “do well out of war” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
Keen, 1998; Chingono, 1996). In Liberia, and demonstrating how Africa‟s wealth has become its curse, 
faction groups financed the conflict by exploiting natural resources and negotiating “deals with 
European, American and Asian firms” (Hutchful & Aning, 2004). Similarly, in Sudan the control of oil 
and ecological resource fuelled the civil war, while in Nigeria oil sparked localized rebellion against 
profit seeking multinationals, and led to the death of the Ogoni activist, Ken Sarowiwa. In the DRC too, 
diamonds and other precious minerals are attracting illegal miners, smugglers, mercenaries, arms 
dealers and child labourers. According to Amnesty International (eNCA, 2016), multinational 
companies like Apple, Samsung, Sony, Microsoft, Daimler and Volkswagen, among others, are 
“indirectly fuelling conflict in the DRC by buying batteries made from cobalt illegally mined in the 
country” and processed by Huayou Cobalt, a Chinese mineral giant, which employ children as “young 
as seven years in perilous conditions in the illegal mines”. 
In some conflicts, although the leaders may be motivated by greedy and profit, rank and file rebels are 
often motivated by legitimate grievances. In the Mozambique civil war, for example, amnestized rebels 
claimed that economic deprivation, political marginalization and unrealized independence expectations 
motivated them to join the MNR rebel movement (Chingono, 1996). Gurr (1993, p. 24) argues: “The 
greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectations the greater his discontent; the 
more widespread and intense is discontent among the members of a society, the more likely and severe 
is civil strife”. Depravation and marginalization breeds disillusionment, which in turn force people to 
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adopt violent solutions. In and of itself, however “depravation is no guarantee that groups will pursue 
their goals using violent behavior” (Porto, 2002, p. 13). In fact, none of Africa‟s many wars have been 
started by the poor and marginalized people united in a quest to create a just society. Instead, more 
often than not, wars are started by the disaffected, and sometimes greedy and power hungry, elite. 
In another work, Collier et al. (2006, p. 3) argue that, from an economist‟s perspective financial 
viability is the most important cause of conflict: “The economic theory of conflict argues that the 
motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself 
financially”. No doubt financial viability is crucial to the success or failure of a rebellion, and indeed 
without it a rebellion can be stillborn or easily crushed. Nonetheless, to dismiss motivation as 
unimportant and financial viability as the most important variable in violent conflict seems erroneous. 
Hypothetically, for instance, in the vast, under-populated and diamond rich Botswana, potential rebels 
could financially sustain themselves, as in the DRC, through illegal diamond sales, but because there 
are no serious grievances against the government the country is enjoying relative peace. In other words, 
financial viability is a necessary condition for sustaining insurgency, but the cause of conflict is to be 
found in political economy. 
Collier et al. (2006, p. 4) further argues that, “economists who have studied rebellions tend to think of 
them not as the ultimate protest movement, but as the ultimate manifestation of organized crime” in 
which “‟insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates”. True, the need for financially viable 
has meant that, some “civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into 
conflicts in which short-term economic benefits predominate” (Melaine, 2013, p. 8). Notwithstanding 
this reality, labeling as “criminals” all those who sacrifice their lives fighting for freedom and 
independence, for example, the Eritreans who liberated their country from Ethiopia and the South 
Sudanese from Sudan, is not only to miss the point, but is also arrogant, insensitive and insulting. The 
rebels‟ “litany of grievances against the government, for its oppression, unfairness, and perhaps 
victimization of some part of the population” (Collier et al., 2006, p. 4) is effective propaganda 
precisely because it resonates with people‟s daily experiences. Effectively, this economist perspective 
criminalizes “just wars” and wars of self-determination, wars which are recognized in international 
law. 
Criticizing the economic motives paradigm, Mkandawire (2002) suggests that, the reward for 
insurgency should be seen not only narrowly in financial or material terms, but also in psychic and 
spiritual terms. Joseph Kony‟s Lord Resistance Army in northern Uganda is a typical rebel group that 
seems not primarily concerned with immediate economic gain, but by grievances against the perceived 
oppressive and unChristian government. 
As Wallerstein (1999, p. 250) aptly puts it: “We have been continuously arrogant in seeking to impose 
on each other, and with such violence and cruelty, our subjective images of the perfect society”. In 
short, this economist‟s perspective‟s embedded practices of “othering”, de-legitimizing the “other”, and 
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“de-valuing” explanations offered by participants—villains and victims alike-constitutes a form of 
violence which privileges western epistemology over the rest, and as such can only breed hatred and 
counter-violence. 
To sum up, as Porto (2002, p. 14) notes, a “new geography of conflict, a reconfigured cartography in 
which resource flows rather than political and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines” has 
emerged in Africa. Although oftentimes overshadowed by ethnic, religious and weak state variables, 
economic and ecological variables remain important in virtually all conflicts in Africa. A violent 
expression of a distributional conflict, resource wars are about the perennial political questions of “who 
gets what, why and how” of the scarce or abundant resources, questions whose urgency have been 
amplified by population explosion. Would development be the answer? 
 
8. Development and Democratization  
Is it a coincidence that Africa, the world‟s least developed continent, is also one of the most politically 
unstable? According to Gurr (cited in Porto, 2002, p. 14) “for the last half century at least, societies at 
low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies”. 
In a similar vein, Collier et al. (1999, p. 7) note: “Civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low 
income countries… [and] the higher is per capita income on an internationally comparable measure, the 
lower is the risk of civil war”. They argue that, “higher income per capita reduces the duration of civil 
war and the probability of its occurrence” Collier et al. (1999, p. 7). Yet, development, like 
underdevelopment, can also generate violent conflict.  
Development, as quantitative changes that lead to qualitative improvements in standards of living, 
entails new beliefs, values and practices. Oftentimes, these new beliefs, values and practices are 
resisted by formerly privileged social groups, whose power base is undermined by change. Indeed, 
development has spurred conflict between traditionalists and modernists, rural dwellers and urbanites, 
the older and the younger generations, and feminists and patriarchs, with issues like women, children, 
gay and lesbian rights dividing and unsettling African societies. In a critique of western development 
discourses, Escobar (1995, back cover blurb) observes that “development policies became mechanisms 
of control that were just as pervasive and effective as their colonial counterparts”. For Escobar (1995), 
“the struggle against developmentalism is nothing less than a struggle for reclaiming the dignity of 
cultures that have been turned into a set of experimental subjects, waiting to be sacrificed at the end of 
a defined set of operations…” To the extent that western forms of development denigrate local cultures, 
beliefs and practices, they constitute violence, and generate counter violence in the form of wars of 
self-determination, militant calls for Islamic states and persecution of Christians. 
Paradoxically, and through calls for democratization, former slave and colonial masters are forcing 
freedom on Africans. While to most people democracy is the political vehicle for decent livelihood, 
equal rights, a reasonable income, access to education and health (Wallerstein, 1991), for African 
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dictators, it is a threat to their power and ill-gotten wealth, and thus destabilizing. Dismissing calls for 
democratization as new forms of colonialism and western domination, some African leaders, for 
example, in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have done everything in their power to crush 
pro-democracy forces, often resulting in violent deaths. In Moslem Africa, and reflecting what 
Huntington (2011) calls “the clash of civilizations”, attempts at democratization are deemed anti-Islam 
by Islamic Jihadists, and have led to increased anti-state and anti-west militancy. Clearly, as 
Wallerstein (1999, p. 18) notes: “Everyone speaks of it … But democratization will not diminish, but 
add to, the great disorder”. The point is, by allowing many voices to be heard, democracy has led to 
discord and vacillation on controversial policies, thus precipitating conflict and compounding the 
legitimacy crisis of the state. 
 
9. The State, Poor Governance and Corruption 
The state in Africa, variously known as a “failed state”, “weak state”, “neo-patrimonial state” or 
“kleptocratic state” (Bayart, 1995), and precisely because of its pre-eminent role in either satisfying or 
frustrating people‟s needs and desires for happiness, has been at the centre of political instability and 
violent conflict. Poor governance and leadership, characterized by neopatrimonialism, patronage, 
personalized rule, incompetency, inefficiency and corruption, have engendered a crisis of legitimacy of 
the state, which in turn has led to Machiavellian struggles to capture, control, consolidate and use state 
power against opponents. Hutchful and Aning (2004) observe, “poor governance is the most important 
single cause of conflict”, and poorly governed countries will remain “the primary locale of present and 
future wars” (Porto, 1999, p. 6). Africa‟s “„Big Man‟, the leaders who have dominated the post-colonial 
era” (Russell, 2000), have completely disregarded the good governance principle of leadership renewal, 
and consequently threw the continent into violent turmoil. For example, Eduardo dos Santos of Angola 
and Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea have been in power since 1979, Museveni of Uganda since 
1986, and the late Maummer Gaddafi of Libya since his 1969 coup detat. Museveni, who ended years 
of murderous rule under dictators, Idi Amin and Milton Obote, and who once said, “leaders who 
overstayed in power were the root of Africa‟s problem”, has just won a fourth term in an election 
which was held while his main challenger, Kizza Besigye, was in detention (AFP, 2016, p. 27). 
Museveni changed the constitution in in 2005 to abolish a two-term limit—Burundi‟s Pierre 
Nkurunziza and Rwanda‟s Paul Kagame have followed suit—and has justified his tenacious hold to 
power thus: “How can I get out of a banana plantation I have planted and which has started bearing 
fruits?” (AFP, 2016, p. 27). 
When the ruled, frustrated with empty promises, no longer recognize such arrogant and power-hungry 
rulers as their legitimate representatives, “violent solutions can occur, and the traditional means of 
using the state to maintain dominant-class hegemony deteriorates” (Gramsci, 1971). As Wallerstein 
(1999, pp. 17-18) puts it, faith in the rulers had “one enormous political consequence: it was incredibly 
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stabilizing. …Today the world has lost that faith, and having lost it the world has lost its essential 
stabilizer”. Compounding the problems of poor governance and political instability is corruption. 
Corruption, which has permeated every sector of society, is not only retarding the continent‟s 
development, but is also an important “push factor” for conflict (News24, 2016, p. 26). According to 
News24 (2016, p. 26), “African leaders are using their defence budgets to buy loyalty and build 
„patronage networks‟, which is driving recruits to” insurgent groups such Boko Haram, al-Queda and 
al- Shabaab. Russell (2000, p. 12) notes, over the years “Africa has bread more brutal and bloody 
thirsty tyrants, but no one has so comprehensively pillaged a state” like the “King of Kleptocracy”, 
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (DRC). Boasting to be the second richest man in the world—while his 
country was becoming a “fourth world”—his “fortune was estimated at between two and five billion 
pounds” (Russell, 200, p. 18): his ambassador to Japan sold his country‟s embassy, and was not 
arrested (Hungwe, 2015). In another “brazen act of kleptocracy”, Abacha, Nigeria‟s military ruler from 
1993 until his death in 1998, is suspected to have looted up to $5 billion of public funds during his 
reign (Gaffey, 2016). Nigeria is ranked “136th out of 168 countries in Transparency International‟s 
2015 Corruption Perceptions Index”, and $6.8 billion in public funds had been stolen by government 
ministers and bankers between 2006 and 2013 (Gaffey, 2016). Such gross corruption has “undermined 
states‟ perceived legitimacy and led to a sense of disillusionment” and violent conflicts across Africa 
(News24, 2016, p. 26). 
In short, with a few exceptions, and from colonialism to the present, African people have been under 
gangster and thug rule. At independence, White colonial racialists were replaced by Black 
pseudo-revolutionaries who, sooner than later, became the new greedy oppressors of their people. In a 
classic replay of Orwell‟s (2014), Animal Farm, erstwhile freedom fighters, like mercenaries, are 
violently suppressing their people‟s freedoms and demanding a larger share of the dwindling “national 
cake”. Such poor leadership, mis-governance and corruption have not only held back development but 
have also fuelled conflicts, as poor governance and corruption increase the risks of conflict and, as 
happened in the DRC, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Libya, “whenever a dictatorship collapses 
there is a civil war” (VOA, 2015, p. 2). Ominously, and presumably to get away with genocide and 
mass murder, some African leaders are contemplating leaving the International Criminal Court: a 
glimmer of hope is offered by the Senegalese president, who offered to reduce his term as president, 
and the new Tanzanian president, John Magufuli, who has “shaken Tanzania to its core as [he] went in 
search of” corrupt public officials (Warunga, 2016, p. 21), and who has substantially cut down 
government expenditure. The African state‟s legitimacy crisis and violence can be traced back to the 
colonial era. 
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10. Colonial and Global Roots of Africa’s Conflicts 
The political economy of Africa, and its current susceptibility to violent conflict, was defined by the 
economic and political interests of European powers under colonialism. As Azar (1990, pp. 10-12) 
points out, “contemporary war can be understood better if we explore the birth of states and how they 
have come to be governed”. Established during colonialism to protect the parochial interests of a white 
settler minority which controlled the economy (mining, industry and agriculture), the state was never 
seen as legitimate by the colonized. First, colonialism was a imposed through violence, and not 
surprisingly it generated cults of counter violence in the form of violent liberation wars in, for example, 
Angola, Algeria, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe among others. Contemporary cults of violence 
and counter-violence in some African countries are therefore a continuation of the violence of 
colonialism. 
Second, inherited intact at independence, the post-colonial state has retained its colonial trappings, and 
has at best been unable to satisfy the needs of the majority, and at worst has frustrated them, thus 
catalyzing the degeneration of politics into warfare. As a “capstone state” imposed atop local 
communities from above (Hall, 1987) or a “balloon suspended in mid-air” lacking organic roots into 
society (Hyden, 1986), the post-colonial state cannot be expected to promote popular happiness. 
Established to protect the parochial interests of white settler minorities, the post-colonial state, in its 
present form, is a blunt tool for the task of satisfying the needs of a culturally and ethnically diverse 
majority. The wars in Somalia, Nigeria and Mali are thus partly a manifestation of inappropriateness 
and inadequacies of the post-colonial state. 
Third, arbitrary colonial boundaries, which separated some ethnic groups into different countries while 
forcing other different ethnic groups into one country, have been a major source of ethnic conflicts and 
even genocide. For example, the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda and the Shona and Ndebele of Zimbabwe 
had lived as neighbouring kingdoms in the pre-colonial period, only to be forced into one nation by 
colonialism. As a result both countries have experienced ethnic violence and genocide; in Zimbabwe a 
Matabeleland based group is seeking autonomy and statehood of the Mthakwazi (Matabele) land. 
Border conflicts, such the one between Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu Islands, and secessionist 
wars, such as the one that led to the break-up of Eritrea from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan, 
are all obvious consequences of arbitrary colonial boundaries. 
Forth, and with even far reaching ramifications, colonialism entrenched dependency of African states 
on their former colonial masters, and completely shaking off the joke of colonial dependency is proving 
a difficult task. More than half a century after it was formed as the Organization of the African Union, 
the African Union (AU) is still struggling to be financially independent. As the AU Commission 
chairperson, Nkosana Dlamini-Zuma lamented, “the continent‟s heavy dependency on funding from 
the West”—Canada, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the World Bank and the 
European Union—poses a “risk of those countries dictating the AU‟s activities” (Times of Swaziland, 
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2016, p. 4, p. 13). The post-colonial state‟s capacity to deliver and satisfy communal interest is limited 
by its dependency on the west, the inequitable international system and a “rigid or fragile authority 
structure which prevents the [it] from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents” 
(cited in Miall, 1999, p. 74). 
Finally, in order to protect their national interests, former colonial powers have continued to meddle 
with Africa‟s internal politics, supporting some groups while opposing others and thereby contributing 
to violent conflict. Al Jazeera‟s (2014) French African Connection documentary shows the extent to 
which the French have gone in trying to ensure that African rulers in its former colonies defend French 
interests. African leaders opposed to Western interests, like the late captain Sankara of Burkina Faso, 
Patrice Lumumba of Congo (now DRC), and Nkwame Nkrumah of Ghana were deposed through 
Western complicity, and African states that try to resist western domination, such as Zimbabwe, are 
often demonized and punished with sanctions. 
Dominated by global forces, many of Africa‟s conflicts have external roots, while others are residues 
from Cold War politics. As Reno (1999, p. 45) argues, warlord politics in Africa are partly an 
inevitable consequence of “the end of the Cold war”, which “shifted the distribution of opportunities 
available to African rulers, whose old strengths and vulnerabilities were altered as they responded to 
these changing external conditions”. In a similar vein Azar (1990, p. 155) notes: “Many conflicts 
currently active in the underdeveloped part of the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation 
between internal and external sources and actors”. During the Cold War the superpowers, in their 
struggle for hegemony and expansion of “spheres of influence”, supported client movements and states 
as proxies and surrogates. For example, in Angola and Mozambique‟s civil wars the West supported 
rebels while the former Soviet Union supported the socialist governments respectively. 
The withdrawal of support at the end of the Cold War not only led to the end of the proxy wars, but it 
also created a power vacuum whose inevitable results include, “the spread of violence and the 
emergence of disparate groups, ostensibly fighting in the name of ideology, religion or ethnicity, but 
seeking to finance their operations through local taxation, plunder and pillage” (cited in Porto, 2002, p. 
4). Although the Cold War is over, powerful nations still seek to expand their influence in Africa. In an 
endeavor to counterbalance the West Russia, for example, is expanding its influence in Africa through 
arms export, which fuels conflict: “Russia is pursuing costly state oil and platinum projects in Africa… 
hoping they will bolster sales, including of arms…” (Zimbabwe Situation, 2015). Not to be outdone, 
China is effectively colonizing the continent through unfair economic deals, such as mineral 
concessions. 
Even more pernicious, international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
and the United Nations Security Council, among others, are not only controlled by powerful states, but 
also operate in ways that marginalize and impoverish African states. The UN Security Council is not 
only the most powerful institution in the world but, and as embodied in the veto power principle, is also 
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the most anti-democratic. Veto power is meant to protect the interests of the five powerful permanent 
states of the US, UK, France, Russia and China, often at the expense of weak African states. Calls for 
reform of the UN Security Council, and in particular to include Africa, Asia, Latin America and other 
European countries as permanent members of the Security Council, have hitherto yielded no tangible 
results. The point is, Africa‟s marginality in the global power structure, and as evidenced by the UN‟s 
half-hearted response to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, increases risks and impacts of violent conflict. 
The international division of labour, which was established during the colonial era, encourages African 
countries to export raw materials and import manufactured goods. Since raw materials are more 
susceptible to deteriorating terms of trade, this model of development entrenches African dependency 
on technologically advanced countries, leads to increasing trade imbalances, balance of payments 
deficits and debt, all of which undermine development and the continent‟s capacity to deal with or 
avert violent conflict. 
An even more invidious global source of violent conflict in Africa is the attempt by the West to impose 
supposed universal truths and value systems on the continent. Western truths, argues Wallerstein (1999, 
p. 155) “are not universal truths and if there exist universal truths, they are complex, contradictory and 
plural”. Far from being universal truths, supposed Western truths may, especially in colonial and 
post-colonial contexts, constitute a form of violence against the other. As Wallerstein (1999, p. 155) 
notes, Western arrogance and a racial superiority complex, has been “humanity‟s greatest self-imposed 
limitation” and a pernicious source of violence in Africa in particular, and the Third World in general. 
In Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, for example, the Islamist insurgents are violently rejecting these 
“western truths”, values of democracy and gender equality, which they deem anti-Islamic, and they 
instead seek to establish their own Islamic value systems; imperialism is not dead, but is alive and 
breeding anti-west militancy in Africa in particular, and the Third World in general. In short, 
colonialism and globalization, by entrenching dependency and domination by global forces, have 
contributed to the continent‟s susceptibility to violent conflict. To recapitulate, wars in Africa are 
caused and fuelled by many interrelated local and global factors that mutually reinforce each other. As 
the case of Mozambican civil war discussed below clearly illustrates, in any one conflict, there is often 
more than one causal and escalation factors.  
 
11. Mozambique’s Civil War 
Mozambique‟s civil war, 1977-1992, which by 1990 had claimed the lives of about one million, 
displaced many more, and cost the country US$ 18 billion in economic losses (Hanlon, 1993), which 
was equivalent to four times the 1988 GDP (Saferworld, 1994), is a typical case which shows the 
multiplicity of causal factors in a single conflict. In the vicious conflict, personal psychology, social 
structural and systemic factors all contributed immensely to generating and fuelling the war. Distinct 
and contending perspectives on the causes of war can be identified.  
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First, the individual personalities of both the founding leader of the MNR (Renamo in Portuguese), 
Andre Matada Matsangaisse (the movement is also known as Matsangaisse by the locals) and that of 
Mozambique‟s first president, Samora Machel, played important roles in fermenting the violent conflict. 
As the story goes, Matsangaise was a former Frelimo cadre who was disenchanted by the punishment 
meted out to him for some indiscipline. After release from detention barracks, Matsangisse, being of an 
arrogant and aggressive disposition, was dying for revenge, and when the Rhodesians approached him 
his dreams came true (Vines, 1991). Equally responsible for fuelling the conflict was independent 
Mozambique‟s first president Samora Machel. A nurse turned guerrilla leader, Machel was dictatorial 
and militaristic and was not ready to compromise or negotiate with the rebels, who he contemptuously 
dismissed as surrogates of apartheid South Africa. The war ended when Chissano, the “quiet diplomat”, 
took over as president in 1986 after Machel‟s death in a suspicious plane crash. Chissano bargained and 
compromised with the MNR during a prolonged peace process which resulted in the Rome Ceasefire 
Agreement of 1992. 
Second, and as is always the case, both the belligerents claimed to be fighting for the noble ideals of 
freedom, justice, and peace; fighting for peace is a contradiction in terms. For example, Hoile (1989) 
argues that the rebellion was “bona fide” struggle for democracy and freedom by an oppressed people 
under communist ideology. Third, others like Vines (1991) stress the colonial roots of the conflict. 
Vines (1991) argue that the MNR, which was funded by some Portuguese businessmen, was born as a 
Rhodesian counter-insurgency fifth column, meant to counter the Frelimo government‟s support of 
Zimbabweans freedom fighters based in Mozambique. 
Forth, and focusing at a later stage of the conflict, when the MNR had been inherited by SA at 
Zimbabwe‟s independence in 1980, Hanlon (1993) stresses apartheid South Africa‟s “total strategy” of 
destabilizing the frontline states, especially those that haboured ANC freedom fighters, as the main 
cause of the conflict. Fifth, and related, the Cold War, as manifested in the ideological conflict between 
Eastern block-backed Frelimo‟s socialist government and western-backed Renamo rebels, fuelled the 
conflict. Thus both Frelimo and Renamo were proxies and surrogates of the communist and western 
blocs, respectively, which provided them with material and ideological support. Not surprisingly, the 
end of Cold War led to the end of the civil war. 
Sixth, ethnicity was a latent causal and escalation factor in the conflict. Reflecting the ethnic divisions, 
the ruling Frelimo is dominated by Southerners while the rebel Renamo by Ndaus from the central 
region. Indeed, some people in the central and north provinces complained that, because of the ethnic 
bias of the Frelimo government, the economic resources of the country are used to develop only the 
south and areas around the capital Maputo (Chingono, 1996). Seventh, Frelimo‟s attempt at suppressing 
both Christian and traditional religions, which it deemed archaic and primitive, forced peasants to turn 
their backs against the Frelimo government and support the rebel cause (Geffray, 1990). For the 
peasantry, steeped in tradition, superstition, spiritualism and ancestor veneration, Frelimo‟s socialist 
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ideology which condemned religious beliefs and practices as archaic, and “obscuntarist” was 
threatening. In protest against suppression of their traditions and religious beliefs, many a peasantry, 
especially from the central regions of Manica and Beira provinces, voluntarily joined the ranks of the 
rebels (Geffray, 1990). Religion not only fuelled and legitimated war, but it also helped people deal 
with the tensions that arise from violent social change by providing the means for negotiating the 
personal, social and political conditions they experience. 
Eighth, and as evidenced by the current demands by RENAMO to violently get autonomy for six 
provinces of the central and northern regions, the desire for territorial control and self-determination. 
Critics have dismissed these demands as naked greed for power. In fact, and finally, and as rational 
choice theorists (Keen, 2004) stress, some corrupt and greed groups—military commanders, arms 
producers, illegal dealers—fuelled the war because they profiteered from it. 
Ninth, changes in the key actors and in the internal and external environments led to changes in the 
goals and dynamics of the conflict. For example, the death of Machel and the end of the Cold War, 
contributed to the end of the civil war. After the collapse of the eastern bloc, Mozambique, a former 
Portuguese colony, not only joined the west but even became a member of the Commonwealth; in 
politics and international relations there are no permanent friends. Finally, the importance of certain 
factors varied with the stage of the conflict. For example, at the beginning of the Mozambican civil war, 
ideology and Cold War politics were the major driving factors of the conflict. Today, with the former 
socialist Frelimo government having embraced capitalism and the Cold War over, ethnicity—which 
was underplayed during the civil war—is now the major source of tensions. 
In short, personalities, ideology, East-West rivalry, regional geopolitics, ethnicity, religion, economic 
resources and/or marginalization all contributed to fuelling the conflict (Chingono, 1996). 
Consequently, as Mozambique‟s experiences suggests, none of the contending perspectives on the 
violent conflict in Africa is completely correct or entirely wrong, but instead each present a partial 
picture of the far more complex reality of violent conflict. As Miall, H et al. (1999, p. 66) observes, no 
single “all-encompassing explanation will be adequate for conflicts of different types with different 
starting points… that have different histories and cultures and are at different stages of economic and 
political development”. Therefore the challenge is to transcend the inherent limits of mono-causal and 
ahistorical analysis by developing a more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach based on a critical 
synthesis of the contending theories.  
 
12. Towards a Holistic Theory of Conflict in Africa 
A multiplicity of multilayered and interrelated local and global causal and escalation factors coalesce to 
generate violent conflicts in Africa. The most important and recurrent factors in causing conflict 
include, political governance, social structures and processes, individual personalities, ethnicity; 
religion, ideology, economic motives (both greedy and grievances), the colonial legacy, the 
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international capitalist system and global power politics. The importance of these factors varies in 
different conflicts and contexts, in different phases of a conflict, and some factors are overshadowed by 
others during conflict.  
For instance, in the DRC access to mineral resources seems the major catalyst of conflict, but in Mali, 
Nigeria and Somalia it is religious ideology, while in Burundi, CAR and Kenya it is poor governance 
and democratization. In most conflicts there are often multiple and multilayered causal and escalation 
factors that coalesce to create conditions for violent conflict. For example, in the North and South 
Sudan conflict, self-determination, territory, religion (Christian south versus Moslem north) and 
economic resources (sharing of oil revenue) all contributed to the conflict. As in Mozambique, the 
influence of certain factors varies with the phases of the conflict, and changes in both the key actors 
and/or the external environment influence the dynamics of the conflict. 
Invariably, and partly because of both governments and rebels‟ propaganda campaign, some of the 
important causal and escalation factors are underplayed during war, only to destabilize the post cease 
fire peace. In Libya, Nigeria, Mali and Somalia, for example, Islamic fundamentalism is portrayed as 
the major cause of conflict, yet such religious militancy is feeding on poverty, economic 
marginalization and disillusionment. As de Villiers (2015, p. 3) observes, underlying these manifestly 
religious conflicts are “local grievances as a result of political and socio-economic marginalization and 
the inequitable distribution of resources” in these countries. Resources, ideologies, religions and other 
factors identified above as causes of conflict are essential means to happiness, however conceived. 
The overarching cause of violence in Africa, which underlies the apparent causes, is therefore the 
desire for the good life and happiness. State failure to satisfy this undying desire for happiness has 
fuelled violent conflict in Africa. As Freud (1961) aptly observed, the inadequacies of our methods for 
regulating human relationships at the family, community, national and international levels are the 
major source of unhappiness and conflict. This failure, especially in economic and political governance, 
has increased the gap between what people want and what they get, expectations and gratifications, and 
has become the main driver for violent conflict. Through its monopoly of power, the state can satisfy or 
frustrate certain basic communal needs, thus preventing or promoting conflict (Azar, 1990, pp 10-12). 
Yet, as Gramsci (1978, p. 83) pointed out, when, and for whatever reason, the state experiences a crisis 
of legitimacy and the hegemony of the governing class deteriorates, violent solutions can occur. 
Compounding the legitimacy crisis of the state and hence fuelling violence is globalization, which has 
accelerated social division, fragmentation and polarization. 
In short, as Jabri (1996, p. 8) suggests:  
War is (a) a multicausal phenomenon, where different causal sequences may apply to different conflict 
situations, and (b) a result of decision-making paths which, far from suggesting rationality… point to 
the view that rationality is bounded by institutional roles and established norms which impact upon the 
informational and analytic loops which actors may go through prior to the onset of war. 
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Tilly (2007, p. 5) observes, collective violence erupts as a result of a “confluence of shared 
interests”—between local groups and global actors—that must be “organized, mobilized and 
resourced” in the “continuous power struggle between those who have decision-making powers, and 
those who have not”. To identify the “confluence of shared interests”, the historical processes and 
choices leading to, and presented by, violent conflict, a holistic and multi-disciplinary analytical 
framework that integrates insights from different disciplines is needed. 
 
13. Summary and Conclusion 
The simultaneous ubiquity and uniqueness of war is perhaps the most glaring feature which comes out 
glaringly clear in African conflicts. Attempts at understanding the seemingly senseless wars have led to 
the emergence of competing theoretical accounts of war, with different scholars focusing on, and 
emphasizing, different causes and dimensions of conflict. Incompatible as they are, there is an element 
of truth in each of these perspectives, for people go to war for a multiplicity of reasons.  
As shown, political violence in Africa has many inextricably interlinked, local and global, causal and 
escalation, factors, some more or less important than others. The personalities of the protagonists, the 
relations between conflict parties, economic, ethnic and religious conditions, and external forces have 
all contributed to shaping conflict goals and dynamics. Underlying these apparent causes of conflict is 
the desire for happiness. Therefore, to paraphrase Clausewitz (1971), for the pleasure seeking animal, 
man, war is a pursuit of happiness by other means. By its very nature, war, its goals and dynamics, are 
neither amenable to the certitude of rational calculation nor to mono-causal analysis. 
Thus, to get a big picture of such complex wars, a holistic and multi-disciplinary approach that 
transcends the limits of the “intellectual silos” paradigm and that integrates the competing theoretical 
perspectives is necessary. A holistic approach is also necessary because the globe is “home to different 
cosmologies with different diverse knowledge systems and, each of these may have different ways of 
knowing and [justifying war], often these are indeed constituted at different realities” (CODESRIA, 
2015, p. 1). Only through a holistic analytical framework that stresses the complex interconnections 
between the various, local and global, multiple and multilayered, apparent and latentcauses of conflict 
can we hope to make sense of the chaos. 
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